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ACCIDENT, MISTAKE, AND RULES OF LIABILITY IN
THE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY LAW OF TORTS
MORRIS S. ARNOLDt
In the fourteenth century, it was evidently a familiar principle
in the law of torts that no one was liable to make compensation for
injuries attributable to some entirely providential cause. Tenants
were therefore not liable in Waste for damage caused by tempests,l
earthquakes, 2 or fires of spontaneous origin.3 The identical prin-
ciple obtained in trespass: 4 Fires that arose "suddenly" or "un-
beknownst" to a defendant could not furnish a basis for fixing him
with liability, even if they originated in his house.5 For example,
f Professor of Law and History, and Director of the Office of the President,
University of Pennsylvania. B.S.E.E. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University of Arkansas;
LL.M. 1969, SJ.D. 1971, Harvard University.
I would like to acknowledge here my very real debt to the rather large number
of people to whom most of the ideas in this Article were exposed for their com-
ments and suggestions. Professor John H. Langbein was kind enough to invite me
to present much of the present Article to his Workshop in Legal History at the
University of Chicago Law School in March of 1979, and an earlier version of the
present work was given to the Legal Studies Seminar at the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School in May of this year. I profited greatly from suggestions at both
these places. I would, however, like to acknowledge especially the help provided
by my colleagues Stephen B. Burbank, Alexander M. Capron, and Clarence Morris.
Some of the matters discussed in this Article are dealt with briefly in the
introduction to my forthcoming book Select Cases of Trespass in the King's Courts,
1307-1399, to be published by the Selden Society. The treatment given them
here, however, is both deeper and broader than seemed appropriate to an intro-
duction to a collection of legal records. Moreover, the exposition here is a good
deal more lawyer-like than one would expect to encounter in that context.
I Walker, The Action of Waste in the Early Common Law, in LEGAL RECORDS
ANn THE HssToaw 185 (J. Baker ed. 1978).
2 CP 40/466, m. 59 (1377).
3 Walker, supra note 1, at 198.
4 As used in the fourteenth century, the term "trespass" was synonymous with
the modem term "tort." Thus, trespass actions included more than just actions
against those who physically invaded others' land. This Article uses "trespass" in
its broader sense.
5 See Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common
Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. Bzv. 1, 14-15 (1970); Ogus, Vagaries in Liability for the
Escape of Fire, 27 CAlM. L.J. 104, 105 (1969); Winfield, The Myth of Absolute
Liability, 42 LAv Q. REv. 37, 46-50 (1926).
The action on the case in common form for damage by fire appeared early in
the fifteenth century. See text accompanying note 20 infra. It alleged that the
fire had been the defendant's, and much was sometimes made of this proprietary
element. See, e.g., Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. 4, f. 18, pl. 6 (1401). It was, of course,
difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe a proprietary interest in a fire which arose
from spontaneous combustion or the like.
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in 1390, a writ complained of the vi et armis burning of the plain-
tiff's house.6 The defendant answered that his house had caught
fire "suddenly, by accident" and that a sudden gust of wind had
caused the fire to spread to the plaintiff's neighboring residence.
7
Pleas of this sort are numerous enough to make it certain that they
were considered legally sufficient; otherwise, they would have drawn
demurrers."
It was also apparently settled that contributory negligence 9
was a good defense to an action in trespass. Thus, defendants very
often attempted to show that a plaintiff's injuries had been a result
of his own foolishness. An interesting example of this defense
occurred in 1376, when a plaintiff alleged an assault and battery,
claiming that the defendant "had stamped on her with the hoofs
of a horse." 10 The defendant said that she and the plaintiff had
been watering their horses when the bridle of the defendant's horse
fell off into the water; the horse, attracted by the whinnies of other
horses, had then bolted. The plaintiff, the defendant said, had
been trampled in an attempt to stop the runaway, and had received
an injury which the defendant rather ungratefully characterized
as the result of the plaintiff's "foolishness and fault." The defend-
ant thus laid the injuries to the plaintiff's act and denied that there
was any "malice or wrong" on her part.'"
6 CP 40/516, m. 364v (1390), Case no. 35.7 in my forthcoming volume CASES
OF TRESPASS IN THE KING'S COURTS 1307-1399 [hereinafter cited as CASES OF
TRESPASS].
7 The words of the plea are that the defendant "ignorante et invito ignis subito
per infortunium in domibus [of the plaintiff] accendit et domos suas ibidem
concremavit ita quod ex invino ventis flatu ignis ad domos ipsius [plaintiff] volavit
et sic per infortuniam et contra voluntatem [of the defendant] dampna in hac parte
... evenit [to the plaintiff]." CP 40/516, m. 364v (1390), Case no. 35.7 in CASES
OF TRESPASS, supra note 6.
8For examples of similar pleas, see 42 LmER AssisAaum, f. 259v, pl. 9 (1369);
CP 40/417, m. 57v (1364), Case no. 35.4 in CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 6.
9 See note 14 infra. See also note 16 infra.
10 CP 40/463, m. 387 (1376), Case no. 2.18 in CASES OF TRESPASS, supra
note 6. The words of the plea are: "earn cum pedibus cuiusdam equi concul-
caverunt."
Il Id. The words of the defendant's plea are that if any injury occurred,
"hoc fuit ex stultitia et defectu eiusdem [plaintiff] .. . et non ex aliqua malicia
sive injuria ipsius [defendant]."
In a similar case late in Richard I's reign, a defendant claimed that he had
been shooting at the butts, and that after he had let an arrow fly, the plaintiff
walked into the line of fire. Thus, the plea ended, the injury resulted from the
"foolishness and fault" of the plaintiff and not from the defendant's "malice or will."
KB 27/546, m. 21v (1297), Case no. 2.31 in CASES OF TREsPAss, supra note 6.
The words of the plea are that the injury "fuit ex stultitia et defectu [of the
plaintiff]."
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The causal relevance of a plaintiff's negligence is even more
clearly demonstrated by a case from 1374.12 The defendant in this
case claimed that while he was defending himself with a knife
against an attacker, the plaintiff had stepped suddenly out of the
shadows and that the defendant had accidentally stabbed the plain-
tiff, who had got in his way. So, the plea concluded, the injury had
resulted from the plaintiff's "negligence, foolishness, and own act"
and not from any "intention or malice" on the defendant's part.'3
Contributory negligence was, therefore, well established as a de-
fense to an action of trespass.14
Taken together, these two rules form an altogether unsurpris-
ing and unexceptionable proposition: that a person is not liable
for injuries resulting from an act unless he "did" that act.15 In the
case of "sudden happenings," the defendant has in an obvious sense
not acted at all-these are acts of God-and in the case of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, it is the plaintiff, not the defendant,
who is perceived as having "done" the act resulting in injury. But
if a person was not liable if he had not caused the injury, was he
necessarily liable if he had caused it? That is, was a plaintiff
obligated to show not merely that a defendant had done the act
complained of, but also that he had acted negligently? 16 The
12 CP 40/456, m. 24v (1374), Case no. 2.21 in CASEs OF TREspAss, supra
note 6.
7s Id. The words of the plea are that the injury "fuit de negligencia, stulticia,
et facto suo proprio . . . et non voluntate sine aliqua malicia [of the defendant]."
A second case from 1374 also demonstrates the causal relevance of the plain-
tiff's negligence. The plaintiff in this case complained of being trampled vi et armis
by a horse. The defendant replied that in a rescue attempt the plaintiff bad
foolishly got in the way. Therefore, the defendant's plea continued, the injury had
been "the fault, and [had resulted] from the own act, of the plaintiff," and had
not resulted "from [the defendant's] malice." CP 40/454, m. 33v (1374), Case no.
2.16 in CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 6. The words of the plea are that the injury
"fuit in defectum et de facto proprio [of the plaintiff]" and "non ex malicia [of the
defendant]."
14 See also W. HoLDswonTH, 3 A HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 378-79 (3d ed.
1923). Professor Holdsworth criticizes the use of the term "contributory negli-
gence," but accepts the general rule that "if the act which caused the damage was
the act of the plaintiff himself, then it is no cause of action." Id. 378.
15 See Gregory, Trespass to Nuisance to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359,
361-62 (1951); Malone, supra note 5, at 6; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts: Its History, in 3 SELECT EssAYS IN ANGLO-AIUmCAN LEGAL HISTORY 474,
504-05 (1909).
16 Although some scholars maintain that medieval trespass law equated the
absence of negligence with inevitability, see, e.g., W. HoLoswonm, supra note 14,
at 381-82 (quoting Professor Wigmore); Malone, supra note 5, at 14 n.45, this
Article will explore situations in which counsel and the courts seemed to use
"negligence" to mean the failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
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fact that contributory negligence was a defense is of no help in
answering this question, because that doctrine is as much at home
in a legal system which imposes strict liability on defendants as it is
in one which imposes only a duty of due care.
Negligence could certainly be a basis of liability and lawyers
of the age very clearly saw the difference between acts of God and
negligence, as a very interesting discussion about the ambiguity
of the concept of "accident" reveals. Early in the century, a de-
fendant sought to escape liability in Waste by claiming that the
damage had resulted from accident (mischance).17 This promptly
brought an objection from Serjeant Herle:
"Mischance" can be defined several ways: it can mean
lightning, or thieves, or the defendant's fault [default].
And so it could be [i.e., in the last instance] that the de-
fendant would be liable for an accident; and you have not
said specifically what the mischance was.' 8
In other words, injuries which were accidental in the sense that
they were unintentionally inflicted might still be compensable and
the defendant's "fault" (that is, negligence) could be a basis for
ordering the compensation. But aside from intentionally inflicted
injury, was fault the only basis of liability? The view that the
plaintiff was not in every case obligated to demonstrate fault on the
defendant's part is supported mainly by two well-known aspects of
the medieval law of torts. First, plaintiffs alleged the defendants'
negligence only in very rare circumstances, and second, defendants
even more rarely, if ever, tried to plead their own lack of negligence
in bar to an action.
It will be the aim of this Article to explore the inferences
which may be derived from these indisputable and undisputed
facts concerning the part fault played in medieval tort-liability
rules. I hope to show that references to defendants' negligence and
intention in fourteenth-century cases can be explained by the fact
that trespass actions were employed to subject defendants to both
criminal and civil liability. I will demonstrate that proof of inten-
tion was essential to establish the criminality of the defendant's
act, but that neither intention nor negligence was essential to estab-
lish a defendant's duty to compensate a plaintiff for injuries.
17 Reported in British Museum Additional Mss. 5925, f. 91b. Dr. Robert
Palmer very kindly called my attention to this case.
181 d.
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I. ACTIONS FOUNDED ON THE NEGLIGENT
BEHAVIOR OF THE DEFENDANT
Actions in which the plaintiff's writ claimed that the defendant
had acted in a negligent fashion are not numerous. We will leave
to one side the cases in which negligence was alleged in the per-
formance of some contractual obligation, the situation in which
Assumpsit found its most common employment. Instead, we will
examine the kind of case that involved what has come to be de-
scribed as nonrelationship negligence.
There are only a handful of such cases in our period, all of
them from Richard II's reign. A very interesting one from 1395
involved a writ alleging that a guest in the plaintiff's house had
been several times warned to take care of his fire "lest any damage
or harm befall the same house," but, heedless of the warnings, the
defendant had "so negligently and indiscreetly guarded" the fire
that the plaintiff's goods and houses had been burned up.19 Unlike
the action on the case in common form for damage by fire, which
first appears a few years later 20 and which uses the word "negli-
gence," but seems to proceed on the assumption that liability would
attach without fault,21 the instant case is clearly grounded in neg-
ligence.
A fire case early in the century, in which Walter of Langeton,
Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, was defendant, was taken to law
through the special-commission device rather than common-law
writ; its ticket into the King's court was not the general vi et armis
jurisdiction. Because Langeton had abused his power as Treasurer
of England, a special commission was appointed to try complaints
against him "for his various and numerous oppressions." 22 One
19 CP 40/537, m. 260v (1395), Case no. 38.2 in CASES OF TRESPASS, supra
note 6. The defendant entered a general denial. The words of the writ are that
cum . . . [the plaintiff] prefatis [defendants] ut ignem suum in domo
predicta ne dampnum vel malum aliquod eidem domui eveniret salvo et
secure custodirent sepius premunierit, predicti [defendants] premunicionem
huiusnwdi minime ponderantes, ignem suum in eadem domo tam negli-
genter et indiscrete costodierunt quod bona et catalla ipsius [plaintiff] ad
valenciam . . . in domo predicta existencia ac domus illa pro defectu
ipsorum [defendants] combusta fuerunt ....
Id. A very similar writ was employed in 1371. See A. Knuxy, THE ACTION ON
TE CASE 214 (1951).
20 1 have seen no examples of the common-form action in the fourteenth cen-
tury. The first reported case is Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. 4, f. 18, pl. 6 (1401).
21 See Malone, supra note 5, at 14.
22 The record of the work of the commission is enrolled in KB 27/242, m. 131
(1320). It will appear in CAsES or TREsPAss, supra note 6, as Case no. 35.2.
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such complaint was brought by Jon de Shorne, who alleged that
the Bishop and his men had, without invitation, lodged themselves
in the plaintiff's granges and had burned them down along with
their contents.23  Neither negligence nor vi et armis was alleged;
the claim was that the damage had resulted from the defendants'
outrageous conduct (par lour outrage).24  Probably the modern
notion of gross negligence is close to the liability idea pressed
here. In any event, the case was tried on the theory of negligence:
The defendant answered that the loss had occurred "entirely by
accident" and "not through the defendant's fault or lack of care"; 25
the plaintiff replied that the fire had "occurred through the de-
fendant's lack of care." 26 The jury, in a special verdict, told a har-
rowing tale of recklessness on the defendant's part and concluded
that the granges and their contents bad been "totally burned up
through the lack of care of the Bishop and his men." 27
Some years later, a writ complained that the defendant had so
negligently and improvidently ridden his horse that the horse had
knocked the plaintiff to the ground, causing him, in the stereotyped
rhetoric of the case, to despair for his life.28 The defendant an-
swered that he had hired the horse from someone he described as a
"Hakenay Woman" and that immediately after he had mounted
the animal had taken the bit in its teeth and run away with him.
He added that he had had no previous knowledge of the animal's
propensities and had unsuccessfully used all his strength to stop it.
The horse, he conceded, had brushed against the plaintiff and
knocked him down. The plaintiff first claimed that the plea was
unresponsive, but three terms later he relented and replied that
the defendant had in fact had notice of the horse's bad habits and
23 Id,
24 Id.
25The words of the plea are that the fire "non fuit per defectum ipsius
Episcopi aut per aliquan pravam custodiam suorum etc .... set incendum illud
penitus provenit ex infortunio etc." Id.
26 The words of the reply are that "predicta combustio accidit ex dlectu
custodie ipsius Episcopi." Id.
27The jury said that the granges were burned "pro defectu custodie ipsius
Episcopi et hominum suorum .... " Id.
28 CP 40/543, m. 221 (1398) and CP 40/551, m. 119 (1398), Case nos. 38.1a
and 38.1b in CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 6. The words of the writ are that
"cum idem [defendant] super quendam equm apud London nuper equitasset pre-
dictus [defendant] equm ilium tam negligenter et improvide gubernavit quod equs
ille prefatum [plaintiff] ad terrain ibidem dejecet ita quod do vita eius desparabatur
.... " CP 40/543, rn. 221 (1398), Case no. 38.1a in CASES OF TREsPAss, supra
note 6.
[Vol. 128:361
FOURTEENTH-CENTURY LAW OF TORTS
thus had been negligent.29 The jury found that the defendant
had had no such notice, and judgment 'was given for him.80
An important aspect of this case is that it indicates that the
gravamen of the scienter actions (actions for knowingly keeping
dangerous animals) was negligence. The plaintiff very clearly has
this theory in mind, for his amended reply states that the defendant,
"before he mounted the aforesaid horse, had notice of the bad habits
of the aforesaid horse, and thus the same [defendant] so negligently
and improvidently drove the aforesaid horse that the horse threw
the said [plaintiff] to the ground so that he despaired for his life." 31
Of course, what is most interesting about the fire and running-
down cases is not that they demonstrate that a person was liable
for injuries attributable to his negligent acts.3 2  We have already
seen that such was the case; 83 indeed, it would be astounding if
the rule were otherwise. What is most interesting about these
cases is that the plaintiffs in them actually alleged negligence as
the basis of liability. The question that immediately arises is why
they should have done so if proving negligence was not necessary
to their recovery. Although these cases provide no definite answers,
one possible explanation is that these plaintiffs thought that by
emphasizing the negligent aspect of the defendants' behavior, they
could aggravate the wrong and increase their recovery. Damage
verdicts are usually inscrutable and we can rarely discover what
theories of liability, if any, lie behind them. Perhaps the plaintiffs
alleged negligence simply to establish that defendants were the
29 See note 31 infra.
30O CP 40/453, m. 221 (1398), Case no. 38.1a in CASEs OF TnEspAss, supra
note 6.
31 The words of the plaintiff's reply are that "idem [defendant] antequam ipse
super equm ilum ascendit habuit noticiam de malis condicionibus equi predicti.
Et sic idem Johannes equm predictum tam negligenter et improvide gubernavit quod
equs ile ipsum Nicholaum ad terrain dejecit ita quod de vita eius desperabatur."
CP 40/551 m. 119 (1398), Case no. 38.1b in CAsES OF TREsPASs, supra note 6.
It is possible, of course, to see the liability for damage done by animals as
-essentially strict, and to see the owner's knowledge as relevant to establishing him
as the cause of the injury. If an owner has no knowledge of his animal's bad
habits, it is easier to think of the animal as "doing" the injury, but if the owner
does know, his act of keeping the animal makes it easier to think of him as pro-
ducing the damage. Under this theory, in other words, the owner's knowledge is
relevant because it takes the case out of the realm of accident in its broadest sense.
Thus negligence is not an element to be provided by the plaintiff in addition to
"cause"; it is the very thing which supplies a causal link otherwise difficult to
make out.
32 1 have noticed only one other case in the rolls involving a writ alleging
negligent driving; the defendant did not enter a plea, and the case has already been
noticed. See A. Ku usy, TnE ACTION ON TE CA sE 102 (1951).
33 See the discussion of Serjeant Herle's remarks in the text accompanying note
10 supra.
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"cause" of the injury. But this much is clear: It is hard to draw be-
lievable inferences about liability rules from the fact that negligence
actions were rare. It is well known that writs alleging intentionally
inflicted injuries were employed to give remedies for unintentional
torts; 34 it is thus also possible that negligence was a part of a
plaintiff's case even if he did not allege it.
II. ACTIONS IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT ATrEmPTED TO
PLEAD IN BAR A LACK OF FAULT
If a defendant had ever pleaded a lack of negligence when a
plaintiff had made no mention of negligence, that would be some
evidence that fault was thought of as part of the plaintiff's case.
Defendants apparently never did so, however. In a case from 1290,35
defendants pleaded to a contra pacem 36 writ that the damage com-
plained of, if any, had occurred by accident and not by any lack
of care or wickedness on their part,3 7 but the plaintiff's count had
in fact alleged "foolishness and a lack of care." 3 In Richard II's
reign, a plaintiff brought a writ in common form, claiming that the
defendant had burned his house vi et armis.39 The defendant
replied that his master, the plaintiff, had ordered him to heat up
an oven, and that when he did so, flames had shot out the back of
it and consumed the plaintiff's house. The damage he therefore
laid to the "incompetent and negligent manufacture and mainte-
nance" of the oven.40  Issue was finally taken on the servant's "neg-
ligence and malice," 41 but, whatever this phrase may mean, it first
appears in the plaintiff's reply and not the defendant's answer.
Thus, this case is no different analytically from those in which neg-
ligence is alleged as the basis for the action.
34 See Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III (pt. I), 74 LAw Q.
REv. 195, 216-18 (1958), for a discussion of the enforcement of the scienter liability
under color of a vi et armis writ.
35 Walter de Brainton v. Herbert of Pinn, 1 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF
Kuxc's BENCH 181 (G. Sayles ed. 1936).
36 1 am assuming that the allegation of contra pacem was, for present purposes,
in all important respects identical to the allegation of vi et armis.
37 Walter de Brainton v. Herbert of Pinn, 1 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF
Tim KMI's BENCH 181 (G. Sayles ed. 1936). The words of the plea are that the
damage, if any, "fuit per infortunum et non per aliquam malam custodiam seu
nequiciam ipsorum." Id.
38 ld. The words of the plea are: "per eorum insipienciam et inalum
custodiam."
39 Cp 40/507, m. 366 (1387), Case no. 35.6 in CASES OF TRESPASS, supra
note 6.
40 Id. The words of the plea are that the flames shot out "pro incompetenti
et negligenti factura et reparacione eiusdem."
41 Id. The words of the reply are "necligencia et malicia."
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Research has uncovered only one case in which a defendant not
charged with negligence offered a plea which might be taken to
mean that he had not been negligent; but a close inspection reveals
that this interpretation is almost certainly wrong and, moreover,
that the defendant's intention had not been to avoid the duty to
compensate. In 1379, what must surely have been a grudge case
was brought by one neighbor against another 42 The claim, couched
in typically formal terms, was to the effect that the defendant had
broken the plaintiff's house and carried away parts of it. In fash-
ioning his plea, however, the defendant revealed what was almost
certainly the truth of the case. The parties to the action, the plea
alleged, had owned adjoining townhouses in Rochester, and the
defendant had hired masons and carpenters to remodel his. While
they were engaged in this enterprise, the story ran, some stones
and tiles had fallen on the plaintiff's house, causing a trivial amount
of damage; indeed, the defendant said that the damage did not
amount to a single penny. He also stated, and tried to plead, that
the act had been without malice on his part and that the damage
had been caused unintentionally and "against his will" ("encountre
nostre gre"). The plaintiff objected that those facts did not amount
to an answer to his writ, for they did not amount to a confession
of liability, a denial of the facts, or a justification for "cause." 4.1
No resolution of the plaintiff's objections is reported, but the court
revealed little inclination to allow the plea.
At first blush, it is debatable what the defendant meant by
his plea and what he thought proving it would accomplish. It is
just possible that, by saying that the damage occurred "against his
will," he meant to indicate that he had acted as carefully as anyone
might be expected to act in the circumstances, that is, that he had
in fact not acted negligently. If so, this case would be important as
an example of an attempt by a defendant, in the context of a writ
that did not allege negligence, to escape the duty to compensate
by showing a lack of fault on his part. On balance, however, this
explanation of the proffered plea seems unlikely, for it requires
a somewhat contorted translation of the phrase "encountre nostre
gre," and its aberrational, indeed unique, character would alone
be reason for suspicion. If that is so, then all the defendant is
saying is that he did not inflict the injury on purpose, and that is
4 2 Jankyn v. Anon. (1378), YEA Booxs op RicH~mw H: 2 RicHmw II 1378-79,
69 (M. Arnold ed. 1975).
43 As discussed below, the notion of "cause" was important in the fourteenth-
century law of torts. See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
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clearly irrelevant because the plaintiff certainly did not need to
make out a case of intentional injury in order to recover. The
defendant's motive in offering the plea, then, evidently lay else-
where than in an attempt to escape the duty to compensate.
How is the defendant's state of mind relevant if it does not
affect the plaintiff's right to damages? The answer lies in the fact
that an order to pay compensation to the plaintiff was not the only
incident of a judgment for a plaintiff in trespass. An unsuccessful
defendant was also subject to amercement and to imprisonment
and fine. Amercement was a small mulct, usually fairly trivial,
which was exacted for any number of offenses that a person might
commit during a trial. An unsuccessful defendant would be liable
to pay it simply because his defense had been found false. As we
shall see,4 however, imprisonment and fine were available against
the defendant only if he was in some measure wicked and thus
deserving of punishment. Moreover, the fine was often quite
large,45 and a person from whom one was demanded would not be
released from prison until it was paid.46
The defendant in this case argued specifically that even if he
were liable for damages, he would not be liable for fine or amerce-
ment. His primary aim in pleading a lack of wrongful intention,
therefore, was not to escape the duty to compensate, but to avoid
imprisonment and its attendant fine.47 The court denied his
proposition, but that was probably because he attempted to make
his excuse too broad: He wanted to be exempt from both fine and
amercement, and that was asking too much from his lack of mens
rea.
III. THE CRIMINAL ELEMENT IN TREsPAss
A number of scholars have noted that the action of trespass
was in some sense criminal. 48  As this section will demonstrate,
44 See section I infra.
45 As is well known, a fine was so called because it was paid to make an end
(finis) of imprisonment.
46 Maitland made the same observation in F. MArrLAND, EQurrY AND rim
FoRMs oF AcTIoN AT CommoN LAw 343 (1910). Imprisonment was also used to
encourage defendants to satisfy plaintiffs' damage awards, for imprisoned defendants
were not released until they satisfied any judgment for compensation.
47 1 believe that ordinarily the defendant's lack of intention was put in issue
by the formulaie denial of "force and arms and whatever was against the peace,"
which preceded every plea in a trespass case. The plea may originally have been
jurisdictional as well.
48 See, e.g., W. HOLDSWoRTH, 2 A I-xsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 365-66 (4th ed.
1936); 0. HoLMS, THE CoMMoN LAw 34 (1881); 2 F. FoLLocK & F. MA ,LAxo,
Tim HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 512, 526, 572-73 (2d ed. 1898); Milsom, Trespass
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it is now for the first time clear that the allegations of contra pacem
regis and vi et armis were thought of in essentially criminal terms.
Herle, J., said in 1321 that there could be no force (vi) without
the intent to use force.49 It is clear from the context that he thought
a jury finding of an unintentional battery would be repugnant to
the plaintiff's claim of assault and battery; but, unfortunately, we
cannot be certain what he thought the effect of such a finding should
have been. Possibly the writ would have abated on the ground of
repugnance of the verdict. Another possibility, however, is that
the verdict would have been accepted as the basis of a judgment
for compensation, although the defendant would not have been
liable to imprisonment and fine because he had not acted with
criminal intent. Indeed, this was a solution resorted to frequently
in the fourteenth century. The matter is important enough to
discuss in some detail.
In 1320, a defendant was alleged in a vi et armis writ to have
submerged the plaintiff's goods in water after they had been con-
signed to him for carriage5 0 The jury, in an interesting special
verdict, indicated that, due to the inexperience and negligence of
the crew, the ship had run aground and that the crew had taken
some of the goods and sold them; the owner, it was said, had later
ratified (acceptavit) the crew's acts. On these facts, the court gave
judgment for the plaintiff for the value of the goods. The court
noted in its judgment, however, that the defendant would be
amerced only, and not imprisoned and fined, "because the said
trespass was not committed against the peace." 51 The act was not
against the peace apparently because possession originally had been
obtained by the plaintiff's delivery and not by a trespassory taking.
from Henry III to Edward III, Part III: More Special Writs and Conclusions, 74
LAw Q. REv. 561, 584-85 (1958). But see Malone, supra note 5, at 9-11; Wood-
bine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (pt. 2), 34 YAL L.J. 343, 359-60
(1925).
Professors Woodbine and Malone assert that trespass originated in civil, not
criminal, actions. Even if true, this assertion is not inconsistent with the notion
that trespass actions in the fourteenth century combined elements of civil and
criminal liability, for the origin of trespass is not crucial to this point. Moreover,
there is reason to doubt this assertion. Woodbine, whom Malone follows, fails to
mention that imprisonment and fine were possible consequences of a judgment for
the plaintiff in trespass. He thus fails to explain how an action which supposedly
derived from civil roots came to include criminal sanctions.
49 Houton v. Paston (1321), 2 Eyn or LoNnor 282 (H. Cam ed. 1969).
Herle's words are: "force ne put estre saunz volunte de fere force."
50 KB 27/240, m. 34 (1320).
51id. The court's words are: "quia dicta transgressio non fuit facta contra
pacem etc."
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In 1322, a writ for taking goods was brought against defend-
ants who, according to the jury's special verdict, had purchased the
goods from persons unknown who had stolen them.52 The court
probed the jury with special interrogatories: Had the defendants
been acting in concert with the thieves? Had they known that the
goods belonged to the plaintiffs? The jury said that the defendants
had in no way been connected with the original theft and had
not known at the time they bought the goods that the plaintiff
owned them, but the jury volunteered the information that the
defendants had learned the truth immediately after the purchase.
On these facts, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff, but no
judgment was given for imprisonment. It is probably right to
guess that the civil liability was clear from the beginning and that
the purpose of the interrogatories was to discover whether the de-
fendant was also, as we would say, guilty of a misdemeanor-receiv-
ing stolen goods.
A third example will suffice to make the association of contra
pacem with criminal liability quite clear. The first common-law inn-
keeper's-liability case actually brought to a conclusion occurred in
1368.53 The plaintiff claimed that his goods had been stolen while
he was lodged with the defendant; the defendant replied that he
had given the plaintiff a secure room, that the inn itself was well
built, and that the things had disappeared without his fault. To
this plea the plaintiff demurred. The court sustained the demurrer,
but in doing so refused the plaintiff's prayer for a capias-an order
to arrest and imprison the defendant. He was liable to compensate
the plaintiff, but, the court explained, because he was without fault,
imprisonment and fine were not available. "It would not be rea-
son," the Chief Justice noted, "for [the defendant] to be put in
prison when there is no manner of fault [culpe] in him"; he was
simply "charged by the law" with the duty to pay the value of the
goods.64 In other words, the civil liability was strict, but the crim-
inal liability was not.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the criminal side of
trespass was the impact of mistake on liability. This difficulty
arose most often in the context of a distress when a lord accused
of taking animals vi et armis would allege a "cause" of rent in
52KB 27/249, m. 5v (1322).
58Y.B. Pasch. 42 Edw. 3, f. 11, pL 13, 42 LmiB AssistAumu, f. 260, pL 17
(1368).
5Id. The words of the Chief Judge are: "it ne serra pas reason, quils
serroient mis en prison, lou ils nad nul maner de culpe en eux, mes sont charge per
le ley .. "
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arrears by way of defense. In the Eyre of London, an interesting
colloquy between Herle, J., and the jury reveals that "cause" meant
motive and that if the lord's motive for taking the beasts had been
rent enforcement, he would not be liable to imprisonment and fine,
even if, on the facts, he actually had had no reason to distrain for
the rent.55 Herle explained that "one who thinks he has a right
and makes a distraint for his rent . . . does not act against the
peace"; 56 he distinguished between "cause" and "reason"-the first
meant the subjective motive of the defendant, the second meant
the objective reality of the situation. There was much discussion
in the numerous cases of this kind about whether the whole writ
should abate if the cause were found true, but no one ever con-
tradicted the underlying assumption that imprisonment and fine
were inappropriate in cases of this sort. Stanton, J., opined that if
vi et armis lay in such a case, then so would an appeal of robbery,
and that, he said, "could not be." 57
The allusion to the appeal Is here is significant, for it is further
evidence that the essence of the vi et armis and contra pacem alle-
gations was wrongful intention, some element of mens rea. Clearly,
this was the gravamen of the complaint in an appeal of mayhem,
as some very interesting cases reveal. Sometimes mayhems were
brought to law under a trespass writ for assault and battery and
sometimes by an appeal. Technically, an appeal of mayhem was
supposed to end in a criminal sanction only, but during the course
of the fourteenth century the aim of this procedure became en-
tirely compensatory.59 Eventually, a recovery in trespass became
res judicata in the event of a later appeal arising from the same
injury.60
The relationship between trespass and the appeal of mayhem
was therefore an interesting one. Because the appeal of mayhem
originated as a criminal procedure, it retained its allegation of
felony. This meant that, even though the point of the "action"
had become compensation, the question of intent was central to it
55 Medelane v. The Prioress of Stratford, 2 ErE or LoNDoN 133 (H. Cam
ed. 1969).
561d. 134. The words of Herle, J., are: "celui qe entende daver droit et fare
destr(esce) . .. ne fet pas encontre la pees."
57 Id. 135. The words of Stanton, J., are: "sil en tiel cas feut receu al Quare
vi et armis-par neim la reson, il sereit receu a son appel de Roberie . .. quod esse
non potest."
5SAppeal (appellum) was the distinctive procedure by which felonies were
prosecuted. In appeals, plaintiffs always alleged defendants' felonious intent.
59 See generally YEAR Boor 18 EDWARD III, Iv-lix (L. Pike ed. 1857).
60 KB 27/312, in. 22 (1338); KB 27/512, rn. 6 (1389).
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and not simply ancillary, as in the case of an ordinary trespass action.
We therefore get explicit pleas negating intention in bar to these
actions, contrary to the situation which obtained in trespass." In
one case, a defendant said that while he had been chopping a log
with an axe at night, the plaintiff, his servant, had been holding a
candle for light. According to the defendant, the plaintiff had
held his hand too close to the point of impact, so that the defendant
had severed one of the plaintiff's fingers and partially amputated
two others.62 The defendant stated that the injury thus had
occurred "per infortunium," and that it had been "contra volun-
tatem [suam]." 63 The jury echoed these phrases in exonerating
the defendant. It is likely that the Law French version of the
latter phrase is encountre nostre gre, the expression employed by
the defendant in the Rochester townhouse case discussed in section
11.64
IV. THE IMPACT OF PLEADING RULES AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
ON THE NATURE OF MEDIEvAL LIABILITY RULES
The attempt to discover the mental elements necessary to give
rise to liability in trespass turns out to be somewhat complicated.
The first complication is that the action apparently had about it
two distinct aspects, one having to do with the plaintiff's right to
compensation and the other with the defendant's liability to punish-
ment. The latter aspect, the criminal one, turns out to be fairly
easily understood: Some wickedness of heart on the defendant's
part was necessary to subject him to criminal liability. On the civil
side of the action, the liability rules are slightly more difficult to
divine.
For the reasons outlined in section 1,65 it seems wrong to draw
inferences about liability rules from the fact that actions affirma-
tively based on the defendant's negligence are rare in the extreme.
However, the fact that defendants never attempted to take issue
on their lack of fault is a relevant datum, even though reading ap-
propriate conclusions from it concerning current notions of liability
appears, at first, somewhat perilous.
The most telling difficulty is that the absence of pleas of this
sort may simply be attributable not to any abstract liability rule but
61 See section II supra.
62KB 27/422, m. 40v (1366).
63 Id.
6 4 See notes 42-46 supra & accompanying text.
65 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
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rather to a pleading rule that barred the defendant from asserting
such facts purely as a technical matter. To simplify somewhat, a
defendant in a writ of trespass was obligated to choose between
two kinds of answer: He either had to deny the physical acts he
was alleged to have done, or he had to admit them and assign a
cause for them. In the case of an assault and battery, for instance,
an acceptable "cause" would have been self-defense. Now if a
defendant wanted to say that he had hit the plaintiff accidentally
(that is, nonnegligently), his story would not technically have fit
either of the two modes of responding to complaints. He had, in
fact, hit the plaintiff, so a denial was obviously of no use; more-
over, he had had no cause, no justification, for hitting him because
"cause," as we have seen,68 was thought of in motivational terms.
Here, the defendant's case was that he had had no motive at all in hit-
ting the plaintiff, for the act of hitting him had been unintentional.
If his facts were usable at all, therefore, they were appropriately
shown only at trial as evidence. If, however, a rule of materiality was
enforced at trial,67 there is a question whether these facts were
receivable as evidence. If they were, it is odd that no trace of an
attempt to plead them is to be found in the Year Books in light of
the fact that serjeants expended so much energy in attempting to
plead evidence in so many other kinds of cases. The absence of
such an effort seems, therefore, to argue for the immateriality of
the facts and thus for a rule of strict liability.6 8
Moreover, it is likely that the rule that the plaintiff could not
on the record vary from the original theory of his claim had an
impact here. By the last quarter of the century, it is doubtful that
a plaintiff who brought a common writ of trespass would have been
allowed to take issue on the defendant's lack of negligence-even
if it were pleadable-for that would have abated his writ. This
principle is nicely illustrated by a case from the sixth year of
Richard II, in which a person who brought a vi et armis writ com-
plaining that his house had been burned down got maneuvered by
66 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
671 have shown elsewhere that the rule of materiality existed in the fifteenth
century. See Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval jury Trial. Out of Sight, Out
of Mind, 18 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 267, 275 (1974).
68Professor Milsom has suggested that pleas of accident were nonexistent be-
cause the facts in them were appropriate to the general issue of "Not Guilty."
This argument appears in its most developed form in S. Mmsom, HssORcAL
FouNDATIoNs OF =ro CortoN LAw 253 et seq. (1969). I agree entirely that the
facts were not pleadable, but for somewhat different reasons, as stated. But if they
were admissible as evidence, it does seem a little odd that no attempt to plead them
was ever recorded.
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his opponent into saying that the burning had been unintentional. 9
In his reply, the plaintiff said that the defendant had come to his
house to distrain and had scared off his servants, whereupon the
unattended fire had burned down his house. Both the opposing
counsel and Belknap, C.J., opined that on these facts a writ of case
should lie, one that did not allege that the burning had been in-
tentional. They had in mind, of course, the view that vi et armis
indicated an intentional wrong. "You should have taken a special
writ on your case since it was not their intention to burn them [the
plaintiff's house and his goods]," Belknap admonished. "Even
though it [the injury] resulted from their act, it was nevertheless
done unintentionally." 70 In a discussion very much like the fa-
mous eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ones in which an enor-
mous muddle was produced in trying to sort out "unintentional"
injuries from "indirect" ones,71 Belknap went on to give other
examples of when Case and Trespass would lie. The plaintiff
eventually changed his plea to one that conformed to his writ.
For our purposes, however, the point is that at least in the latter
part of the fourteenth century, plaintiffs who brought common
writs would never have traversed a plea of lack of negligence be-
cause that would have abated their actions. Thus, it seems that
plaintiffs were left with only one course of action-to demur. The
question then again arises why defendants avoided pleading a lack
of negligence: The most likely reason is that they were afraid they
would lose. Again, a fairly strong case for the existence of a
regime of strict liability in the Middle Ages is made out.72
Finally, the few judicial dicta concerning the nature of lia-
bility rules in the Middle Ages all seem to support the view that the
rule of strict liability was a favored principle. For instance, in the
Rochester townhouse case, 73 Percy, J., fairly clearly indicated his
69 Professor S.E. Thorne, who is editing this Year Book for the Ames Founda-
tion, very kindly made his proofs of this case available to me.
70 Belknap's words are: "vous dussez aver pris vostre bref especial sur vostre
cas depuis qil ne fut pas lour volunte de lez arder mez par infortune; mesqe il vint
de lour fait uncor fut il fait contre lour volunte."
71 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Clarke, 92 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B. 1725); Scott v.
Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773); Leame v. Bray, 102 Eng. Rep. 724
(K.B. 1803).
72 See text accompanying note 68 supra. It might be plausibly argued, how-
ever, that there is a much simpler explanation for the absence of attempts by
defendants to plead that they had not acted negligently. To plead lack of negli-
gence to a writ alleging an intentional injury is not merely unresponsive; such a
plea is perfectly consistent with the plaintiff's case, for intentional torts are non-
negligent.
7 3 Jankyn v. Anon. (1378), YEAR BooKs oF RcuAn II: 2 RIcHARD II 1378-79,
69 (M. Arnold ed. 1975). See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
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opinion that civil liability was strict when he asked the defendant's
counsel whether the plaintiff had been offered any compensation
"as between neighbors... since this was done nonwilfully." 74 The
reference to compensation due to neighbors for unintentional
trespasses brings to mind the animal-escape cases in which the
phrase inter vicinos (between neighbors) was very commonly em-
ployed. It is admitted by all that civil liability in such cases was
strict.75 Percy almost certainly believed, therefore, that compensa-
tion was due.
There are statements in a case from 1401 which seem at first
to indicate some sympathy for defendants who unintentionally
caused their neighbors injury,76 but a close examination of the
case reveals that such a reading is erroneous. In the course of
pleading a case for a client whose fire had got out of control and
burned the plaintiff's house, a serjeant told the court that it seemed
hard to hold the defendant responsible "when there is no fault in
him." '7 But the serjeant was simply indicating that the fault had
been in the plaintiff's servants, and that it seemed inappropriate
to apply a strict liability standard to the master when there was,
in fact, a negligent person who had caused the injury and who
thus seemed more responsible. Moreover, the court replied: "What
is that to us? It is better that [the defendant] be totally ruined
than that the law be changed for him." 78 This clearly indicates a
prevailing ethic in favor of compensation. This ethic was re-
affirmed later in the fifteenth century when Mr. Justice Littleton
opined that "when a man suffers damage, it is reason that he be
compensated." 79 Thus, the inference to be drawn from all the
741d. The judge's words are: "vous navez my allege pur le defendaunt qe
vous ly tendistez ascunes amendez al hostel entre visnez a cause qe ceo fuist fait
encountre vostre gree ....
75 See YEAH Boor OF RIcHARD II: 2 RicHARD II 1378-79, xx (M. Arnold ed.
1975).
76 Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. 4, f 18, pl. 6 (1401).
77 Id. The serjeant's words are: "ceo serra encounter tout reason de mitter culpe
ou default en tin home, lou il nad nul en luy, car negligence de ces servants ne poit
estre dyt son fesauns."
78 Id. The court's words, per Thirning, J., are: "Que est ceo a nous? 11 est
mielux que il soit tout defait, que lia ley soit chaunge pur luy."
79Y.B. Trin. 6 Edw. 4, f. 7, p1. 18 (1467). Littleton's words are: "si un home
ad damage il est reason que il soit recompence." Other contemporary judicial
pronouncements are to the effect that liability is strict. See, e.g., the remarks of Rede,
CJ., in Y.B. Trin. 21 Hen. 7, f. 27, pl. 5 (1506), in which he discusses the concept
of the unintentional trespasser. It is significant that the concept of pure negligence
is simply absent from any medieval discussion.
Professor Milsom has argued that because facts of accident were appropriate
simply as evidence under the general issue and because jury control techniques
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available evidence is that in fourteenth-century trespass actions
civil liability was strict. It would be for a later age to invent the
proposition that some showing of fault was ordinarily necessary in
order to impose on an actor the duty to compensate.
were rarely employed the law of torts remained undeveloped in the middle ages.
See S. MiLsoM, supra note 68, at 10. No doubt the law of torts was somewhat
amateurish by modem standards, and Milsom's insight that this was caused by the
rudimentary nature of medieval trial techniques is a most significant contribution
to our understanding of medieval law. Still, all that is required to have an ele-
mentary liability rule is for jurymen to have shared a common assumption that
liability was strict. Since all the (meager) evidence is that this is what judges
thought, the likelihood is strong that they were expressing a community norm,
which jurors applied in the cases entrusted to them.
